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Abstract 
Traditionally immigrants have been made responsible for a rise in a country’s crime rate, a 
state’s employment market or a nation’s cultural identity. However, since the events of 
9/11 immigrants have evolved into a new kind of security concern. As a result of the ter-
rorist attacks in 2001 by nineteen foreigners, the issue of immigration has become a cen-
tral aspect in counter-terrorism as nations around the world scrambled to implement poli-
cies in reaction to the unprecedented situation. However, one has to question the validity 
and effectiveness of using immigration measures in the fight against terrorism. Is there an 
error in current counter-terror policies? The paper will critically discuss whether immigra-
tion policies are a useful means of addressing the global threat of terrorism.       
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The importance governments and politicians assign to immigration differs and fluctu-
ates depending on the economic, social and political situation. Similarly, the number of 
migrants has fluctuated over the past century, and the countries of origin and those re-
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ceiving migrants have changed. Since 1970 the number of international migrants has 
more than doubled, from 82 million to around 175 million in 2000. This figure represents 
around 2.9 percent of the worlds population, which means that one in every 35 persons 
was an international immigrant in 2000.  Between 1990 and 2000 the number of migrants 
in the world increased by fourteen percent. This signifies a rise of 21 million in ten years. 
In 2000, 63 percent of the world’s migrants lived in developed countries, with most mi-
grants residing in Europe and making up 7.7 percent (56.1 million) of the European popu-
lation (United Nations 2002). Out of the total number of migrants worldwide refugees 
made up around 9.5 percent or 16.6 million in 2000 (United Nations 2003). According to 
the International Organization for Migration (2005) there were an estimated 185 to 192 
million migrants around the world in 2005.  
Terrorism is not a new phenomenon either. One of the earliest groups cited are the 
Sicarii, who were a Zealot religious sect fighting against the Roman rule in Palestine 
between AD 66-73. During the Middle Ages a religious sect of Ismailis and Nizari called 
‘Assassins’ struggled against the empire of Saladin and in the sixteenth century small 
‘terrorist’ groups in Albania and other regions resisted the armies of the Ottoman Empire. 
The term ‘terror’ was first used in 1795 as a policy to protect the fragile government of the 
French Republic from counter-revolutionaries and from around the mid-nineteenth 
century to the First World War revolutionaries and anarchists used bombings and 
assassinations as frequent weapons in their struggle against autocracy (see Sinclair 2003; 
Carr 2002; Anderson/Sloan 2003). After the Second World War terrorism became an 
important part of the anti-colonial struggles, and many scholars have argued that the 
period between the late 1960s and the late 1980s is marked by traditional or so called ‘old 
terrorism’, which can be roughly divided into different types such as left and right-wing as 
well as ethno-national separatist terrorism (Guelke 1998, Waldmann 1998). Since the 
mid 1990s and the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York in 1993 as well as 
the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo underground by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in 1995, some 
authors argue that we are facing a “new terrorism” with new characteristics 
(Simon/Benjamin 2000). Although the new qualities of today’s terrorism can be 
questioned (Copeland 2001; Spencer 2006a), we are being told by many of the policy 
makers and leading terrorism experts that the ‘new terrorism’ we are facing today also 
requires totally new counter-terrorism measures to deal with it effectively (Laqueur 1999; 
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Lesser et al. 1999; Aubrey 2004). “Nothing less than a sea-change in our thinking about 
terrorism and the policies required to counter it will be required” (Hoffman 1998: 212).  
Traditionally, security concerns around migration have revolved around social or eco-
nomic security. This has involved the threat of higher crime rates, the threat to the native 
language and culture as well as the threat of citizens losing their employment due to 
cheaper immigrant labor, rather than actual physical security.  However, this paper hopes 
to examine the specific links drawn between immigration and terrorism after the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th (hereafter 9/11). In response to the attacks by 19 foreign terror-
ists governments have introduced tighter immigration controls and restrictions as part of 
their counter-terrorism offensive. It has become widely accepted by politicians to view 
immigration policy as an important tool in the ‘war on terrorism’. They have articulated a 
link between immigration and international terrorism which has found its way into gov-
ernment policies. Is this linkage between immigration and terrorism a valid assessment of 
the current situation? Are counter-terrorist measures involving anti-immigration policies 
a good or effective way of fighting international terrorism? This paper will critically exam-
ine the validity and usefulness of linking ‘terrorism’ with ‘immigration’.   
The paper will firstly establish some of the instances when governments used immigra-
tion policies as a tool in the ‘war on terrorism’. Following this, section two will highlight 
some of the literature behind the idea of linking terrorism to immigration, followed by a 
brief look at other instances in history when immigrants were targeted in response to a na-
tional security threat. The fourth section will assess the validity of this nexus and put for-
ward the argument that there are clear empirical reasons for questioning the link drawn 
between ‘immigration’ and ‘terrorism’. The final part will summarize the main findings, 
draw tentative conclusions as well as briefly reflect on the problem of evaluating the effec-
tiveness of counter-terrorism policies in general. 
 
Linking Immigration to Terrorism: Government Responses  
 
9/11 was a big shock. Around the world governments scrambled to implement a vast 
range of different counter-terrorist policies to prevent such an attack on their own coun-
try and to reassure their population that they were safe. As part of this wave of counter-
terrorism measures the idea that restricting immigration enhances national security has 
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been used by different governments over the last couple of years to justify a vast range of 
immigration control policies (Martin/Martin 2004).   
Although the immigration policies mentioned below do not allow a generalization as 
such and only represent a sample of the immigration policies implemented, they do indi-
cate and illustrate a certain trend among some of the western states of connecting the is-
sue of immigration with the threat of terrorism. Leading this move to include immigration 
policies as part of the ‘war on terrorism’ is the United States. Soon after 9/11, in October 
2001, President Bush issued the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2 entitled 
“Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies”, which explicitly links immigration 
and terrorism and outlines the plan to fight terrorism with immigration measures (Bush 
2001). In March 2003, the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was incor-
porated into the massive new Department of Homeland Security (DHS), formally making 
immigration a national security concern and bureaucratically linking the two matters 
(Kerwin 2005). 
As a direct response to the 9/11 attacks, although no exact numbers are available, the 
INS arrested and detained more than one thousand mostly Arab and Muslim foreigners 
for immigration law violations in an effort to uncover possible terrorists among them 
(Musarrat et al. 2002). They were rounded up following an administrative order by Attor-
ney General John Ashcroft and kept detained for a period ranging from a couple of days to 
several months. They were not allowed to communicate with the outside world, had no 
direct access to lawyers and their relatives were not given information about their situa-
tion. Many have since been deported on immigration violation charges (Carey 2002).  
Apart from this immediate backlash against immigrants and foreigners the U.S. im-
plemented a number of immigration related measures. For example, they have increased 
the security facilities and personnel on all its borders, revised measures for better vetting 
of immigrants and other individuals applying for entry visas, particularly students and en-
trants under the U.S. refugee program. In order to track people coming to the U.S. certain 
foreigners are required to register with authorities upon entering and leaving the country. 
For example the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS) requires 
foreign nationals in certain age groups and genders from 25 predominantly Muslim states 
such as Iran, Morocco, Pakistan and Indonesia to register with the INS.  They have also 
introduced further personal interviews at an INS office and notification to INS of any 
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change of address, employment, or school for certain immigrants and foreigners. The non-
immigrant who must follow these special procedures also have to use specially designated 
ports when they leave the country and report personally to an INS officer at the border on 
the day of their departure (Lebowitz/Podheiser 2002).  
Apart from these policies and the immediate targeting of immigrants in a massive pre-
ventive detention campaign following 9/11, the U.S. Congress has passed new legislations 
that subjects non-citizens to a number of other wide-ranging discriminatory measures. 
The most comprehensive set of new laws against terrorism targeting immigrants can be 
found in the USA PATRIOT Act1 in Section 411 to 418 entitled “Enhanced Immigration 
Provisions”. The USA PATRIOT Act gives the Attorney General exceptional power to 
detain non-citizens without a hearing and without having to clearly show that they pose a 
threat to national security or that there exists a flight risk. He only needs to declare that 
he has “reasonable grounds to believe” that the non-citizen or foreigner is involved in any 
form with terrorism to justify the potentially indefinite “mandatory detention”. Further-
more, the Act allows foreigners to be deported for associational activity with an organiza-
tion deemed to have any links to terrorism, whether or not there is any connection be-
tween the individual’s actions and any kind or threat of violence let alone terrorism. Part 
of the U.S. policy has also involved law enforcement officials using ethnic profiling in the 
hunt for terrorists, treating immigrants as suspicious on the basis of little more than their 
national origin or Arab ethnicity (Cole 2002a).  
The United States is not alone in the move of linking immigration to terrorism. Tight-
ening immigration regulations, asylum and border controls has been a central aspect of 
British counter-terrorism since 9/11. Politicians in both the Labour and Conservative 
Party have continuously talked about terrorism in connection to immigration. A study by 
Jef Huysmans (2005) has examined parliamentary debates in the UK since 9/11 which 
have explicitly made the connection between terrorism and immigration, asylum or ref-
uge. His findings show “that asylum especially and migration more generally was an im-
portant element in the framing of the fight against terrorism” (Huysmans 2005: 2). Most 
dominantly this connection was made with the introduction of the Anti-terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) in December 2001, which enhances and partly substi-
 
1 Full title: ‘Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to In-
tercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001’. 
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tutes the Terrorism Act 2000. The ATCSA explicitly deals with immigrations matters 
and links them to terrorism in part IV of the act, fittingly entitled ‘Immigration and Asy-
lum’. There are three main issues in this section. For one it deals with the retention of fin-
gerprint data in asylum and immigration cases as well as “an attempt to short-circuit any 
claim to asylum by making the tribunal focus upon the Secretary of State’s reasons for de-
nying the claim” (Walker 2003: 24) Although this measure has been dropped,  one of the 
most controversial measures, was the provision of ATCSA which enables the UK Home 
Secretary to order the detention without trial of foreign individuals suspected of planning 
or intending terrorist attacks in the UK or internationally (Payne 2002). These provisions 
led to accusations that the UK government was holding individuals unlawfully on the 
ground of nationality and therefore breaking Article 5 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights on the grounds of national security (Cornish 2005). 
Although a detailed investigation of the nexus terrorism – immigration in national po-
litical debates in EU member states is cannot be provided here, a quick scan of the mem-
ber reports to the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee shows that many states 
in Europe have also reacted to terrorism with immigration related counter-measures.2 For 
example, France has established joint border patrols with Italy, the UK and Belgium to 
prevent migrants with a valid visa in one country to move to another (Gregory 2003; 
Shapiro/Bénédicte 2003). They have also increased the budget for the border police to 
control illegal immigration. Germany has also increased the resources available for its bor-
der guards and focused its measures on preventing entry to illegal immigrants. In addition 
more information will be collected from visa applicants falling into certain categories in-
cluding biometric data (Hirschmann/Leggemann 2003; Glaessner 2003). Spain, too, has 
implemented a number of immigration measures in the name of fighting terrorism. It has 
increased its border-security and surveillance along its south coast and has tightened al-
ready strict domestic immigration law Alonso/Reinares 2005; Brotóns/Espósito 2002).  
 
 
 
 
2 Individual Reports from member states to the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee are 
available at: http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1373/submitted_reports.html 
(Accessed on March 5, 2006).  
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Linking Immigration to Terrorism: Scholars and Think Tanks 
 
Apart from governments some scholars and think tanks, especially in the United States, 
have argued that immigration and terrorism are linked and that immigration policies are 
essential in the ‘war on terror’. “[T]here is probably no more important defensive weapon 
in our arsenal than a well-functioning immigration system” (Krikorian 2002) One leading 
terrorism expert on al-Qa’ida, Rohan Gunaratna, has highlighted that “[a]ll major terror-
ist attacks conducted in the last decade in North America and Western Europe, with the 
exception of  Oklahoma City, have utilized migrants” (cited in Leiken 2004: 6). 
The fact that the nineteen 9/11 hijackers were of Arab origin and nationals of coun-
tries outside the western cultural hemisphere has created a link between foreignness and 
threat. It is possible to argue that it is totally rational to treat Arab and Muslim foreigners 
differently now, in light of the fact that al-Qa’ida, the group presumably behind the at-
tacks of 9/11, is made up almost entirely of Muslims of Arab origin and has threatened to 
continue attacks against western civilians. The western world was attacked by foreigners 
and therefore it makes sense and is justified that it focuses its efforts on combating terror-
ism with immigration policies which can stop threatening foreigners from entering it 
(Margulies 2002).  
Public opinion polls seems to support this interpretation. Opinion polls in the United 
States show a strong support for the use of immigration policies in the fight against terror-
ism and shortly after 9/11, 89 percent of those questioned thought that is was justified to 
detain immigrants in consequence of the attacks. A further 72 percent support the use of 
ethnic profiling and interviews of men from the Middle East.3 In addition, 92 percent sup-
ported imposing stricter immigration and border crossing policies as a way of dealing with 
terrorism.4 Similar to the United States, public opinion polls published in the UK on the 
subject also show strong support for the use of immigration policies in the fight against 
terrorism. An ICM Research poll carry out for the BBC in April 2004 showed strong sup-
 
3 Survey conducted for ABC News and the Washington Post by TNS Intersearch on 27 November 
2001, at: http://www.pollingreport.com/terror7.htm (Accessed on March 14, 2006). 
4 Survey conducted for FOX News and Opinion Dynamics Poll on 19-20 September 2001, avail-
able at: http://www.pollingreport.com/terror9.htm 
(Accessed on March 14, 2006). 
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port (62 percent) for detaining foreign terrorist suspects indefinitely.5 A different study in 
2003 illustrated that 82 percent of those questioned thought that it was certain or likely 
that “terrorists linked to Al Qaeda are entering Britain as asylum seekers” and 74 percent 
supported the suggestion of detaining “all immigrants and asylum seekers until they can 
be assessed as potential terror threats.”6 In a Populus survey conducted after the London 
bombings in July 2005 showed that 88 percent agreed with using “tighter controls on who 
comes into the country” as a “measure that could be taken to try and reduce the threat of 
further terrorist attack.”7   
There are a number of studies and books which stress this link between immigration 
and terrorism and argue that immigration restrictions are essential in the fight against ter-
rorism. For example, Steven Camarota (2002) emphasizes the link between immigration 
and terrorism by examining the immigrant background of 48 foreign-born terrorists who 
committed crimes in the United States between 1993 and 2001. He examines how these 
terrorists entered the U.S. and concludes that they used a large number of different ways 
of entering the country including temporary tourist, student or business visas, crossing the 
border illegally and filing asylum applications. Furthermore, he notes that thirty-six per-
cent of the examined foreign-born terrorists were found to be legal permanent residents or 
naturalized U.S. citizens. As a result he calls for tighter controls and the reduction of all 
kinds of immigration and points out that a countries immigration system is one of the 
most important tools in the ‘war on terrorism’ “because the current terrorist threat comes 
almost exclusively from individuals who arrive from abroad” (Camaroty 2002: 5).  
Similar to Camarota, Janice L. Kephart (2005) wants to show how “[t]errorists have 
used just about every means possible to enter the United States, from acquiring legitimate 
passports and visas for entry to stowing away illegally on an Algerian gas tanker” (Kaphart 
2005: 7). The study examines 94 individuals considered to be linked to terrorist organiza-
tions. In this case, only terrorists linked to immigration violation are included to make the 
 
5  ICM Research, “Terrorism Survey”, (23-24 April 2004), at: 
http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/polls-archive.asp 
(Accessed on September 7, 2006).  
6  ICM Research, “Terrorism Poll”, (5-6 February 2003), at: 
http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/polls-archive.asp 
(Accessed on September 7, 2006). 
7  Populus, “Terrorist Bombings & The Olympics Survey”, (July 8-10, 2005), at: 
http://www.populuslimited.com/pdf/2005_07_08_times.pdf 
(Accessed on September 6, 2006).  
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link between immigration and terrorism even more visible. This goes as far as only includ-
ing six of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers who actually seem to have violated any immigration 
rules. Apart from linking immigration to terrorism she also focuses specifically on political 
asylum and refugees as potential terrorists. Kephart argues that claims for political asylum 
are a good way for terrorists to enter a country, by pointing out that it keeps them from 
being deported quickly and gives them the opportunity to move around the country. Fur-
thermore, the fact that many asylum decisions are not based on hard evidence but are 
made on the basis of the word of the applicant, makes fraudulent claims easier for terror-
ists (Kephart 2005: 26). 
In a more detailed study of 212 known terrorists arrested or killed in the North Amer-
ica and Europe, Robert S. Leiken (2004) highlights that all were visitors or first- or second 
generation immigrants. He believes that terrorists exploit generous Western immigration 
policies to infiltrate the country in order to recruit new members, create facilities to aid 
their cause and form sleeper cells ready for new terrorist attacks. He concludes that global 
terrorism and immigration are clearly entwined or linked as nearly all terrorists in the 
West have been immigrants (Leiken 2004: 24). More recently Robert Leiken and Steven 
Brooke (2006) have reinforced this claim in one of the leading terrorism research journals 
by examining 373 terrorists and emphasizing “a close link between immigration and ter-
rorism”.   
Along similar lines Michelle Malkin (2002) makes weak immigration policies responsi-
ble for the terrorist attacks in the United States. In her bestseller book Invasion she claims 
to highlight the inadequacies and failures of the U.S. immigration service in letting terror-
ists and other menaces into the country. In a very aggressive, sensationalist and extremely 
nationalist style she argues that the U.S. government should not allow any travelers or 
immigrants into the United States from regions were al-Qa’ida has a foothold and intro-
duce visa-requirements for all countries in world. Furthermore, she calls for a crack down 
on all illegal immigrants and suggests that they should be placed in detention facilities and 
deported as quickly as possible. To name but a few of the extreme measures proposed, 
Malkin suggests that the United States should secure its ports of entry and militarize the 
U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada as well as not accept any new asylum seekers (Mal-
kin 2002: 229-238).   
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The History of Immigrants as National Security Risks  
 
The nineteen foreign terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks seem to have succeeded in 
turning immigration into a national security issue. Nevertheless, most governments have 
had moments were they have feared immigrants and blamed specific groups who were 
seen as a threat to the countries physical security. For example the immigrant German 
population in the United States and the UK during the First World War faced a number 
of discriminatory measures. Thousands of German and Austrian immigrants were sus-
pected of subversion and arrested and German Americans stood a chance of losing their 
jobs and businesses as well as being assaulted in the street in a wave of anti-German hys-
teria (Gerstle 2004). Another example is the internment of Japanese Americans and im-
migrants during the Second World War. The shock of Pearl Harbor, in some aspects very 
similar to the shock of 9/11, lead to the incarceration of thousands of Japanese immigrants 
in guarded camps surrounded by barbed wire as it was feared that they could sabotage 
military installations and infrastructure and prepare the Japanese invasion (Cole 2003).   
The example, which offers the best historical comparison with which to understand 
the current use of immigration policies in the ‘war on terrorism’, is the prosecution and 
deportation of anarchist and radical communist immigrants after the First World War. 
The focus on immigrants, like today, was triggered by terrorist attacks in the United 
States. In April 1919 a total of 36 mail bombs were sent to leading capitalists and gov-
ernment officials and on the 2nd of June bombs exploded within hours at the homes of 
manufacturers and government officials including the Attorney General A. Mitchell 
Palmer’s. The fact that one of the terrorists, who was killed in the attack, turned out to be 
an Italian immigrant anarchist, together with the general perception that immigrants from 
Southern and Eastern Europe were susceptible to such ideology generated suspicion in the 
general public. As measure to prevent further attacks government authorities arrested 750 
immigrant members of these communities in November 1919 and deported around 250. 
This was followed by a second wave of arrests in January 1920 involving the apprehension 
of more than 4000 suspected, mostly immigrant radicals and the deportation of just under 
600 (Murray 1955:79-82).   
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Questioning the Link between Terrorism and Immigration  
 
The brief historical excursion into the plight of immigrants in situations of national secu-
rity highlights the fact that immigrants are easily targeted. As David Cole (2002b) points 
out “[s]acrificing foreign citizens’ liberties is always tempting as a political matter. It allows 
those of us who are citizens to trade someone else’s liberties for our security.” The sup-
porters of the use of immigration policies in fighting terrorism argue that it makes sense to 
target immigrants and foreigners as all hijackers and terrorists were of Arab origin. It is, 
they say, therefore a rational way of reducing the terrorist threat (Carey 2002). However, 
by securitizing the subject of immigration and making it an issue of national security it be-
comes extremely difficult to make any objection to the new immigration policies as doing 
so, as some may argue, would threaten the safety of the country and its people (Freitas 
2002). Regardless of whether there are hidden agendas or alternative ulterior motives for 
arguing in favour of immigration restriction by instrumentalising the currently hot topic of 
terrorism there are also a number of arguments why immigration policies are rationally a 
bad way of fighting international terrorism. 
For example Donald Kerwin (2005) points out that introducing restrictive immigration 
policies in the fight against terrorism is contrary to the economic liberal idea of the open 
and free market. The prosperity and power of the West relies on easy and fast access to 
the global economic market and labor and therefore “[i]t is self defeating to embrace se-
curity measures that end up isolating it from those networks” (Kerwin 2005: 750). As a 
result of tighter immigration policies and especially visa restrictions, the U.S. will probably 
witness slower economic growth in a couple of years. Kenneth Rogoff (2004) highlights 
the extent to which foreign scientists, engineers and businessmen contribute to the 
growth of the U.S. economy and emphasizes that over 2.5 million highly qualified foreign-
ers, holding leading positions in science and industry, work in the United States. More 
than 30 percent of all PhDs awarded in science and mathematics and half of all graduates 
in engineering have come to the U.S. on foreign and student visas. Not only do these stu-
dents contribute $ 12.3 billion to the U.S. economy (Treyster 2003), but traditionally 
many of those who complete their studies remain in the country and work, thereby con-
tinuously contribute to the economic growth of the U.S. “The U.S. economy grows in no 
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small part by skimming the cream off the rest of the world’s workforce” (Rogoff 2004: 71). 
However, with increased visa restrictions being a major part of the immigration policies 
used in the ‘war on terrorism’, many of these workers, who “serve as key transnational 
links for the increasingly globalized U.S. economy” (Rogoff 2004: 71), will not be able to 
come and stay in the U.S. anymore. This trend is clearly visible in the statistics. The 
number of foreign students enrolled in U.S. education facilities declined from 586,323 in 
2002-03 to 572,509 in 2003-04 and 565,039 in 2004-05. There has been a significant drop 
of students form Muslim countries such as Pakistan (- 9,8% between 02/03-03/04 and - 
14% between 03/04-04/05) and Indonesia (- 14,9% between 02/03-03/04 and - 12,6% be-
tween 03/04-04/05) (Institute of International Education 2005). 
Others focus on particular anti-terror immigration policies such as deportation. Au-
thors such as Joan Fitzpatrick (2002: 2) believe that “[d]eporting international terrorists is 
a remarkably short sighted and self-defeating policy.” It seems questionable to want to de-
port people who authorities suspect of having connections to terrorism rather than charge 
them criminally and put them in prison. If people are deported for having connections to 
terrorism, does this not give them the possibility of pursuing further terrorist activity 
abroad where the government authorities do not have the same ability to keep an eye on 
them? If they are truly terrorists, does deportation not give them the possibility of attack-
ing Western targets abroad? Surly it would make more sense to let them stay in the coun-
try and keep them under surveillance (Romero 2003: 103).     
Again different scholars question the utility of tightening border controls and argue 
that it is impossible to make borders utterly impervious to terrorists. Didier Bigo (2002: 3) 
believes that “[t]he idea of a Maginot line against clandestine actions, requiring total se-
curity of air space and of sea and land borders, is not only illusionary; it is also prohibi-
tively expensive in both human and monetary terms, and these resources would be better 
spent on more flexible and pre-emptive approaches.” Specifically, in the case of the UK, 
Elspeth Guild (2003) questions the reasoning behind the government maintaining its bor-
der controls with the rest of continental Europe on the grounds of national security while 
not having systematic identity checks on the Irish-UK border. We are told that ‘new ter-
rorists’ have strong independent financial means and a well organized network support 
system in place around the world. If this is the case they will surly be able to enter the 
country somehow. At the same time making entry hard for legal immigrants will undoubt-
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edly lead to an increase in immigrants attempting to enter the country illegally. As these 
ways of entry become more appealing and in some cases the only way of getting into the 
country, illegal smuggling will subsequently increase which in turn also gives terrorists the 
chance to enter.  Susan Martin and Philip Martin (2004: 336) argue that there is little 
reason to believe that “the smuggling and trafficking operations, which themselves show 
little if any regard for human life or dignity, would not move terrorists along with eco-
nomic migrants if the price was right.”  
 Apart from these specific arguments against some immigration policies as tools in the 
‘war on terrorism’, there is a larger more general argument to be made. Not one of the 
9/11 hijackers was an immigrant and all had entered the United States on temporary vi-
sas. Yet, in the post 9/11 era, the argument that lax immigration controls make a country 
more vulnerable to terrorism has been made by governments, scholars and groups like the 
Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) and the Center for Immigration 
Studies (CIS). These long-time skeptics of immigration have attempted turn those con-
cerns about security into a general argument against openness to immigration.  
The term immigration refers to two very distinct issues. On the one hand it refers to 
“the action of coming to live permanently in a foreign country”, on the other it can also 
be used to describe “the place at an airport or country’s border where government officials 
check the documents of people entering that country” (Oxford Dictionary of English 
2005: 866) Permanent immigrants make up only a very small percentage of the total 
number of the hundreds of millions of foreigners who enter Western states every year. 
While concern for public safety is generally a positive thing many of the measures imple-
mented cast an unacceptably wide uneven net. “The ‘terrorist’ has become the post-
modern substitute for the ‘vicious class’ that nineteenth-century immigration laws con-
structed as a tool of immigration control” (Aiken 2000: 55) The distinction between for-
eigner and immigrant has become blurred in government policies and the dual meaning of 
the term ‘immigration’ has been exploited.  
For one, this is evident in some of the scholarly writing on the subject mentioned 
above. All of the studies use an extremely broad and in some cases inadequate definition 
of the term ‘immigration’. Most include all kinds of movements by foreigners, thereby fail-
ing to distinguish between permanent and non-permanent stay in a country. They seem to 
equate immigrant with foreigner. However, the central characteristic of the concept of 
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immigration is the permanent settlement in a foreign country. Many of the studies count 
people as immigrant who have entered the country on temporary tourist, business or stu-
dent visas. The use of the term ‘immigration’ in this way is too all-embracing to be used as 
the basis for any policy recommendations. The focus has to be more specific. If all terror-
ists can be classed broadly as ‘immigrants’, then we can also class them as foreign, Middle 
Eastern, Muslim, young, male, dark skinned, dark haired, two arms, two legs, one nose 
and human. All of these classifications are true but not very useful information for stop-
ping terrorism (Taylor 2002). 
This extremely wide definition of ‘immigrant’ is also reflected in the policies employed 
by many western governments. However, focusing on certain specific immigrant or ethnic 
groups is both under and over-inclusive at the same time. For one it is under-inclusive be-
cause there are white U.S. or European nationals who may also be terrorist threats. Treat-
ing such a large group as suspicious means that government authorities will miss genuine 
terrorists who do not fit the profile (Romero 2003: 106). At the same time it is over-
inclusive because the vast majority of Arab and Muslim immigrants and visitors have no 
involvement in terrorism what so ever. Arab and Muslim appearance is dangerously inac-
curate with probably 99,9 percent being totally innocent.  
In addition to this international perspective one has to consider that many of the harsh 
immigration related measures such as registration, preventive arrests, detention and de-
portation have reverberated strongly within the entire immigrant community and have 
reduced the willingness of the Arab or Muslim community to cooperate with authorities 
in the fight against terrorism. As these measures have antagonized parts of the immigrant 
population and inspired fear of law enforcement they have clearly impeded on the investi-
gation of terrorist activity in some ethnic communities. These measures have increased 
the mistrust of government and risk of alienating large parts of the immigrant community 
who would otherwise be very willing to cooperate. Counter-terrorism which enforces or 
tightens immigration laws will prevent immigrants from coming forward and reporting 
suspicious potentially terrorist activity in their community if they themselves face arrest, 
detention and deportation. As David Cole (2002a) points out, law enforcement is more 
effective when it works with rather than against communities. If there is reason to believe 
that there are individuals potentially planning terrorist acts in the Arab or Muslim immi-
grant community, authorities would surly benefit more from working together with the 
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large majority of law-abiding and innocent members of the community in order to get 
their help in identifying possible threats, rather than alienating the whole community by 
treating many of its members as suspicious due to their nation of origin, religion or skin 
color.  
There are examples where immigrant communities have played an important role in 
dealing with terrorist groups. Immigrants with an Arab background helped the French au-
thorities dismantle the Algerian Armed Islamic Group in 1995 and Turkish immigrants in 
Germany assisted in tackling elements of the Kurdish PKK (Faist 2004). However, the 
perception in the Muslim communities, even the most westernized, of racist and unfair 
measures targeting them in the ‘war on terror’ is wide spread. “The prosecutions of the 
charities, the surveillance, and the visa discrimination – all of these actions deprive Mus-
lims of their social place and constrict their access to mainstream … society” (Tirman, 
2004). The feeling in these communities of being treated unfairly will undermine the le-
gitimacy of the western world with its claim of standing for democracy, political freedom, 
due process, and equal protection and make the fight for the hearts and minds of the peo-
ple more difficult. Furthermore, studies have shown that where laws and policies are per-
ceived to be unfair and illegitimate, members of the community affected by them are more 
likely to be involved in crime, because people obey laws not because they worry about be-
ing caught, but because they consider these laws or rules to be fair and legitimate (Cole 
2002a).  
The focus on Arab or Muslim immigrants and foreigners not only risks isolating and 
alienating this community but it also reinforces racial, religious and gender stereotypical 
presumptions in the general population. If Muslim immigrants are increasingly segregated, 
stereotypes based on ignorance will become the norm, further isolating immigrants which 
in turn can encourage the growth of genuinely harmful attitudes in the immigrant com-
munities and in western governments and populations (Lohrmann 2000).  
Among immigrants refugees deserve a separate mention in order to underline the 
questionability of linking immigration and terrorism. Although refugees only represent a 
very small proportion of all international migrants the nexus still seems to have been 
made by governments introducing new stricter asylum policies as part of the ‘war on ter-
rorism’. These restrictions are reflected in the numbers of refugees taken in by Western 
governments. Especially the United States has reduced the numbers of admitted refugees 
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dramatically.  In 1999 it admitted 85 006, 72 515 in 2000, 68 426 in 2001 while only 
26,622 were let into the country in 2002 and 28 306 in 2003 (Refugee Council USA 
2003).  
Although no refugees were among the 19 9/11 terrorists, the attacks have created the 
public perception of refugees as potential terrorists and undesirable elements in society. 
Government reactions in many western countries, particularly the US and UK, have rein-
forced this perception and even international organisations such as the United Nations 
have declared that that states must ensure “that refugee status is not abused by the perpe-
trators, organizers or facilitators of terrorist acts” (United Nations 2001a).     
Again there are arguments against this linkage of ‘refugee’ and ‘terrorist’. For one in-
ternational refugee law explicitly excludes those people from protection who have com-
mitted serious crimes against humanity or have violated human rights (Zard 2002: 32). 
Others argue that infiltration of a Western country via its refugee program is unlikely as 
terrorist groups prefer to use operatives who will not have immigration problems. As 
Howard Adelman (2002) points out, there are far easier ways of entering a country than 
through the refugee channels. Upon entry a refugee is exposed to government authorities 
and has to pass a security clearance, give personal information and fill out forms. “Any so-
phisticated terrorist would reasonably be expected to avoid such an exposure” (Adelman 
2002: 11). Helton points out that targeting refugees is wrong and poses risks as indiffer-
ence to refugees compromises safety around the world. Refugees can become dangerously 
radicalized and join terrorist organizations out of resentment of the West for denying 
them a better life or out of lack of alternatives and the necessity of supporting their fami-
lies (Helton 2002: 1-2). Theresa Sidebothom (2004) argues that it would make more 
sense to encourage people to speak out against their governments and support their de-
mocratic activities or their moderate Islamic view by giving them a safety net or some-
where to flee if it is needed. She highlights that this used to be the case during the Cold 
War with the support of pro-democracy groups within communist countries, when the US 
granted asylum and a safe haven to activist and opponents of the regime.  
The obvious irony of linking refugees to terrorism is that many refugees flee their home 
countries because they are classed as terrorists there or are fleeing the same extremist 
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Islamist regimes or groups who sponsor, harbor or tolerate terrorism.8 So while trying to 
protect western people from terror these anti-asylum measures impact heavily on victims 
of violence and terror in other parts of the world. As the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees Ruud Lubbers (cited in United Nations 2001b) stated shortly after 
9/11: refugees are the victims of terrorism not its perpetrators.   
As we have seen the literature provides good arguments against the idea of using im-
migration policies as a counter-terrorism tool. They highlight the fact that the arrests of 
immigrants and foreigners and their deportation following 9/11 have yielded very little in 
terms of prosecuting terrorists. As Nora Demleitner (2004: 572) points out “many of the 
terrorism prevention mechanisms instituted in the wake of 9/11 proved fruitful in detect-
ing undocumented aliens, but not terrorists.” Taking into consideration that thousands 
were arrested in the United States and Europe, the number of prosecutions of foreign ter-
rorists in the West is extremely low. According to a list issued by the U.S. government, 
which outlined the charges brought against those arrested, fewer than five of these 
charges related to terrorism while the majority appear to be immigration violation related 
(Martin 2002: 26). Adding to this is also the fact that many of those arrested were appre-
hended using traditional law enforcement techniques not the immigration system (Kerwin 
2005: 762).  
If it is possible to make rational arguments against as well as question the effectiveness 
of these immigration measures one has to ask why their implementation was so uncontro-
versial in the first place and why they are still considered to be an essential part in the 
struggle against terrorism?  Rather than actually protecting the population from terrorism, 
have these measures maybe only been implemented “to reassure certain segments of the 
electorate longing for evidence of concrete measures taken to ensure safety?” (Bigo 2002: 
3).   
 
Conclusion 
 
The nineteen hijackers who carried out the attacks in September 2001 substantially al-
tered the public idea of immigrants, morphing them into a direct threat of national secu-
 
8 One has to also note that it is difficult to differentiate between a state harbouring terrorists and a 
states granting asylum to people fleeing political persecution. 
 
Volume 2, Issue 2                                                                                                  August 2007 
 
hrss, Volume 2 (2007), pp. 58-79 
www.hamburg-review.de 
75 
rity. Guild (2003: 336) believes that “[t]he 9/11 attacks transformed the face of the for-
eigner into a prima facie face of terrorism.” Following this, the immigration policies intro-
duced as part of the ‘war on terror’ as well as the arrests, detentions and deportations of 
immigrants reinforced this idea. As Demleitner (2004) points out that detention and de-
portation create the impression within the larger public that immigrants, at least from 
Muslim countries are criminals and potential terrorists. Not only will immigration policies 
in the ‘war of terrorism’ alienate the community but such immigration measures will rein-
force the public’s perception or idea of immigrants as potential terrorist threats, which in 
turn again increases the alienation of the community in a kind of vicious circle. Both the 
feeling of being alienated and the perception of that community as alien can lead to in-
creased segregation and possibly radicalization, stoke anti-western sentiments and provide 
for a more acute security threat (Ashar 2002). The discourse on terrorism has become in-
tertwined with the discourse on immigration. Discourse constructs what we consider to be 
problems, in our case immigrants and their potential to be terrorist. The construction of 
the border as the front line in the fight against terrorism has lead people to perceive of 
things crossing this line as potential threats (Pickering 2004).  
Governments have consistently argued that these sweeping measures are necessary to 
prevent further attacks. However, focusing on certain ethnic groups or religions will un-
dermine the all-important legitimacy of western governments in the fight against terror. It 
is in al-Qa’ida’s interest to characterize the conflict as the West against Islam or the 
United States and its allies against Arabs. The more we act in ways that support the pic-
ture West vs. Islam, the more likely it will be that al-Qa’ida and other groups are able to 
attract support for their terrorist cause. International terrorism requires an international 
response and it is therefore essential to maintain as broad a coalition of different govern-
ments as possible. However, when counter-terrorism policies target a certain ethnic group 
due to their nationality or religion this can antagonize their home government or their fel-
low nationals back home whose cooperation is essential in the ‘war on terrorism’. Coun-
tries could react to measures targeting its citizens by reducing or even withdrawing their 
support for international counter-terrorism initiatives (Cole 2003b: 183-210).  
As the article has shown, academic literature on the issue provides ample arguments 
against the use of immigration policies in the war on terrorism. So is there an error in the 
current counter-terror policies? Theoretical arguments may give us an insight into some of 
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the strengths and weaknesses of certain policies but they tell us very little about the actual 
effectiveness of counter-terrorism. What standards could be used to assess the success or 
failure of existing counter-terrorism measures and what are the problems of evaluating 
counter-terrorism?9  
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